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ABSTRACT
Background and Aims This study explores the role of the public health advocacy coalition in alcohol policy develop-
ment in Ireland. Compared with industry actors, much less is known about the membership, activities and influence of
public health advocates in alcohol policymaking. To address this gap, this paper identifies several advocacy strategies,
drawn from the advocacy coalition framework and other policy theories, and then analyses them in the context of recent
Irish developments.Methods The study used theory-building process-tracing to construct a record of the public health
advocacy coalition and its campaign to promote the Public Health (Alcohol) Act 2018 in Ireland. Specifically, we drew
upon 131 primary documents produced by advocates, 464 newspaper articles and 18 semi-structured interviews with
key advocates, public health experts and elected officials to undertake a thematic analysis. Results Public health advo-
cates in Ireland have developed sophisticated political strategies to foster major alcohol policy change. First, public health
advocates led the formation of a broad-based advocacy coalition that helped members to effectively pool their limited re-
sources as well as coordinate their strategy and messaging. Secondly, issue-framing and message discipline played a key
role in the coalition’s success. Advocates strategically focused upon the policy problem, specifically health harms, rather
than the detailed content of the proposed measures. Finally, there is evidence of political learning, where advocates’ prior
experiences and knowledge of the political system in Ireland spurred innovations in campaigning. These strategies were
interdependent andmutually reinforcing, and succeeded in building support for public health advocates’ preferred policies
among politicians and the general public.Discussion/conclusion There are distinct capabilities that public health actors
can mobilize in the policy process to win alcohol policy debates and capitalize on the constraints on industry influence on
alcohol policymaking.
Keywords Advocacy coalition framework, alcohol policy, coalition-building, framing, learning, policy process, public
health.
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INTRODUCTION
For more than two decades alcohol policy issues have been
prominent in Ireland, with the growing recognition that
alcohol-related harms merited legislative responses [1].
Between 1984 and 2011, per-capita alcohol consumption
increased by more than 45% to levels which were very
high by international standards [2]. The economic boom
of the ‘Celtic Tiger’ years made alcohol more affordable in
a culture where both patterns of heavy drinking and absti-
nence were well established [3]. The health consequences
could be seen in the government’s spending data from
the 2000s, with an additional $3.7 billion allocated to
address alcohol-related harms every year [4].
Alcohol was first acknowledged as a health issue in the
government’s 1996 National Alcohol Policy, and again in
two reports published by the Strategic Task Force on
Alcohol in 2002 and 2004 [5]. A 2012 report prepared
by the Steering Group on a National Substance Misuse
Strategy (NSMS) linked rising consumption to increasing
rates of alcohol-related deaths, suicides and chronic
illnesses [6]. Despite recognition of this problem, a legisla-
tive response was slow to develop.
A Fine Gael/Labour Coalition Government formed in
2011 after the deep impact of the global financial crash
in Ireland and took action in October 2013, partly moti-
vated by increasing health-care costs. The Public Health
(Alcohol) Bill was underpinned by four main pillars: (1)
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minimum unit pricing; (2) the structural separation of
alcohol from other products in shops; (3) new restrictions
on alcohol advertising and marketing, particularly as
relating to children; and (4) new requirements for label-
ling [7]. The government’s legislative proposals largely
followed the Steering Group’s policy recommendations
which were, in turn, informed by the international
scientific consensus on the evidence [8]. The structural
separation and labelling provisions provoked the most
resistance from the alcohol industry and its allies. After
a protracted and contested process the legislation was
signed into law in October 2018, with all four pillars
approved by the legislature.
The alcohol industry and the public health community
formed two opposing coalitions during the policy debate
[9]. The stop–go nature of the legislative process followed
duelling campaigns in the media and in parliament. The
alcohol industry’s success in resisting population-level
approaches to alcohol policy has been identified in
Ireland [1,5,6,10–14] and elsewhere [15–23]. In contrast,
public health advocates have typically had limited success.
Study of such advocacy groups is under-developed globally,
with few data available on membership, activities and
impacts [24].
This study examines the public health advocacy
community’s efforts to promote the passage of the Public
Health (Alcohol) Bill (hereafter, the Bill) in Ireland.
Drawing upon concepts from policy studies [25] we
identify different policy change mechanisms, including
coalition-building [26], issue-framing [27] and political
learning [28,9] (see Table 1).We then analyse these factors
in the context of the policy debate in Ireland.
Policy researchers have long been interested in the
processes that facilitate major policy change [29]. The
advocacy coalition framework (ACF) conceptualizes
policymaking as a perennial struggle between competing
coalitions. Advocacy coalitions consist of policy actors
who ‘share a particular belief system’ and that ‘show a
non-trivial degree of coordinated activity’ [30]. Successful
coalitions are those that translate beliefs into policy action
[31,32]. Enlarging the breadth and scope of a coalition’s
membership, or coalition-building, is a key strategy for ad-
vocates [26,33].
Issue-framing presents a second mechanism for
influencing the policy process [34–36]. Framing is a
process that enables actors to ‘present their ideas’, ‘connect
their ideas to important values’ and ‘persuade others of the
validity of their particular interpretation of ideas’ [37].
Issue-framing is intrinsically competitive where there are
opposing coalitions [38].
Political learning shapes how advocacy coalitions pur-
sue their goals. Studies of political learning [28] investigate
how policy actors draw upon past experience and lessons
from other jurisdictions. Scholars using the ACF find that
‘intra-coalition learning’ is most likely to unfold when
levels of inter-coalition conflict are high [39].
Alcohol policymaking is characterized by a high de-
gree of conflict between public health [40] and the alcohol
industry [41]. Advocates, politicians, experts and govern-
ment officials form the basis of public health coalitions.
The latter three sets of actors tend to play secondary roles,
finding ways to support advocates’ work and activities,
without necessarily engaging in outward-facing advocacy.
The alcohol industry coalition consists of alcohol pro-
ducers, wholesalers and retailers, as well as allies from
other sectors and non-health government departments.
Coalitionmembers share a common ‘belief system’ [24]
about the nature of the problem and preferred policy alter-
natives. Each coalition develops frames to broaden support
for their positions [24,41]. Public health actors (see
Table 1), for instance, frame the harms associated with
alcohol for society as a whole, while the alcohol industry
typically emphasizes economic and personal responsibility
frames [40,41]. Broadening the focus to health and social
impacts makes it easier to attract ‘new entrants’ into the
public health coalition [42]. Conversely, the alcohol
industry’s focus upon the economic dimension of alcohol
has helped to mobilize support from stakeholder groups
with a potential interest in the sector’s profitability, includ-
ing specific government departments.
Table 1 Possible theory-based alcohol policy strategies for advocates
Tactics Targets of advocacy groups Description of mechanism and importance
Coalition-building Civil society groups Enables collective action; allows for coordination of
messaging and resources
Elected officials and the public Signalling device to policy actors about credibility/authority
of coalition and widespread support
Issue-framing Elected officials and the public Limits the scope of the debate to the coalition’s preferred
dimension of policy debate
Political learning Elected officials and public Draws on the distinct political expertise and experience
of coalition members to identify successful tactics
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METHODS
The study describes the development and functioning of
the public health advocacy coalition [43]. Drawing upon
131 primary documents (Table 2) produced by advocates
and 464 newspaper articles (Table 3), we identified the
key actors and issue frames. Primary documents were as-
sembled by conducting on-line searches of government
websites, including the HRB’s National Drugs Library.
The Nexis databasewas used to collect relevantmedia pub-
lished in three major national newspapers—Irish Times,
Irish Examiner and Irish Independent—between 2012 and
2018.
Analytical propositions were triangulated with data
from 18 semi-structured interviews with advocates (12),
senior politicians (four), and public health experts (two).
The interviews were conducted in person or using Zoom
between September 2019 and July 2020. Interviewees
were purposively sampled and identified through docu-
ments, media and snowball sampling. E-mail recruitment
yielded a response rate of ~55%. The interviewees included
several of the coalition’s core members, including
individuals from Alcohol Action Ireland (AAI) and the
Royal College of Physicians Ireland (RCPI). Interviews were
also conducted with representatives from several promi-
nent national charities as well as the Irish Community
Action on Alcohol Network.
Interviews were transcribed and uploaded to NVivo
version 12 for thematic coding. Themes were generated
both inductively (from the data, shaped by concepts from
political science and policy studies) and deductively (from
the concepts, and revising the framework, following review
of the data) [41]. The transcripts were analysed iteratively,
with both authors reviewing them and agreeing on
interpretation.
RESULTS
The Public Health (Alcohol) Bill took approximately 5 years
to be passed, and during this period was overseen by
various health ministers. Divisions within the Coalition
Government concerning whether the legislation should
phase out alcohol industry sports sponsorship caused the
first major delay [44]. After the planning and preparatory
work, the Bill was formally introduced in December
2015, without the sports sponsorship proposals, but had
little prospect of being adopted before the upcoming
general election. The 2016 election saw both coalition
partners suffer significant seat losses. Fine Gael subse-
quently formed a minority government, with a confidence
and supply agreement with its fellow centre-right party,
Fianna Fáil, with support for its alcohol legislation [45].
In October 2016 the Bill was introduced in the Seanad
(Senate, upper house). The structural separation provision
prompted significant opposition, with retailers waging a
major lobbying campaign and convincing several Fine Gael
senators to delay progress [46]. The Bill’s fortunes were
revived in 2017, after Health Minister Leo Varadkar’s
elevation to Taoiseach (Prime Minister). The government
then agreed to exempt smaller, rural shops from the regu-
lation [47] and strengthened parts of the Bill, accepting
an amendment from a cross-party group to mandate the
inclusion of cancer warnings as part of the Bill’s labelling
provisions [48]. The Bill proceeded to the Dáil (directly
elected lower house), where warning labels dominated
the debate. As the Irish Times remarked, politicians had
‘not been canvassed so assiduously since the smoking
ban in 2004’ [49]. The legislation, however, was adopted
in October 2018 with provisions due to be implemented
over a 3-year period.
Coalition-building
The public health alcohol advocacy community in Ireland
had traditionally comprised a relatively small group of
non-governmental organizations (NGOs), public health
Table 2 Alcohol advocacy communications analysed
Output type Total records
Media communications (e.g. letters to editor and
editorials) during policy debate (2012–18)*
24
Press releases during policy debate (2012–18)** 88
Policy documents (2008–2018)*** 9
Total output 121
*Newspaper coverage included Irish Times, Irish Examiner and Irish
Independent. **This is not an exhaustive list of advocacy press releases; it only
includes those produced by the Alcohol Action Ireland (AAI), the secretariat
of the Alcohol Health Alliance Ireland. In some instances, member
organizations released individual press releases, so this metric only
captures a fraction of the total communication from advocates. ***Policy
documents were prepared either by advocates directly or by public/private
organizations which had been commissioned to conduct the research.
Table 3 Newspaper coverage of alcohol advocacy actors 2012–18
(total n = 464)
Subject Number of articles
Mention of
Alcohol Action Ireland 81
Alcohol Health Alliance Ireland 18
Royal College of Physicians Ireland 66
Other key coalition members 43
Public health frame 325
Economic frame 169
Children and young people frame 211
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experts, and public health officials. In the past two decades,
however, Ireland has seen a concerted push to professional-
ize advocacy. AAI, a national advocacy organization, was
formed in 2003 and participated in numerous policy delib-
erations, including the NSMS Steering Group. AAI particu-
larly promoted alcohol pricing and availability measures, in
line with the available evidence, in the 2000s. The organi-
zation also established relationships with Eurocare, an
alcohol advocacy alliance at the European Union (EU) level
and their member organizations in different countries. In
2013, when the government announced it would be
acting on the Steering Group’s recommendations, AAI
mobilized a cross-party group of senators and TDs
(members of parliament).
Interest in alcohol policy also extended to the Irishmed-
ical establishment, leading to the formation of an alcohol
policy group in the RCPI in 2012. As one advocate from
the RCPI explained, ‘our [doctors] had been going to the in-
ternational meetings of liver specialists and were alarmed
by the rate of liver cirrhosis in Ireland’. Led by Dr Frank
Murray, a liver specialist, the group hoped to inform alco-
hol policy by drawing on its members’ experience. This in-
volved generating policy positions on population-level
measures [50], including minimum unit pricing and sports
sponsorship [51].
Key figures in RCPI and AAI decided to mobilize other
organizations who supported the principles of the Bill.
Drawing inspiration from the contacts and organizational
model of the UK counterpart, the Alcohol Health Alliance
Ireland (hereafter, the Alliance) brought together 62 orga-
nizations, including numerous prominent health charities
and professional medical bodies. The Alliance appointed
Dr Frank Murray as Chair and a steering group to lead
on strategy and communication. The Alliance was
officially launched at RCPI in March 2015.
The resources and prestige associated with leading
figures enhanced participation in the coalition.Many inter-
viewees singled out Dr Murray and the RCPI, explaining
how the two brought a ‘level of communications and PR
expertise’ that the advocacy community had previously
lacked. Others concurred, describing ‘the arrival of liver
specialists’ as the game-changer. This observation is consis-
tent with research on advocacy from other settings. The
growing interest in alcohol policy by liver doctors marked
a major turning point in the mobilization of public health
advocates in England [24].
Psychiatrists and public health specialists reinforced
perceptions that the medical community viewed alcohol
as a far-reaching problem, impacting broadly on health
and society. As one advocate explained, AAI had been ‘a
small charity, a small voice, [and] a lone voice, with a
limited budget’ and so the inclusion of organized medicine
enabled the Alliance to ‘speak with more authority’ on al-
cohol harms. From a messaging perspective, the Alliance
also assisted advocates in coordinating their activities. As
one member remarked, traditionally there were ‘lots of
disparate voices shouting out in an uncoordinated way’.
The Alliance ensured that when an issue was raised in
the media, the most effective voice articulated the public
health position (see below).
Establishing a broad coalition also helped to strengthen
the advocates’ credibility in the eyes of other actors.
Although the steering group led on strategy, the optics of
having a broad membership gave the Alliance ‘more clout
with the public, with politicians, and with the media’. Sup-
portive politicianswhoworkedwith theAlliance instructed
them ‘to attach as many logos as possible’, as that would
make it ‘impossible for [the politicians] to ignore’.
An additional advantage of the Alliance is that it
allowed actors to draw ‘on the strength, and the reputa-
tions’ of its membership. Interviews revealed a systematic
process for handling media inquiries, including an ‘infor-
mation sheet’ about policy positions and a ‘contact sheet’
that was circulated to media outlets. The latter ensured
that reporters were contacting the appropriate expert
when they had questions about aspects of the Bill. For ex-
ample, if queries arose concerning the link between alcohol
and cancer, themediawould be directed to the Irish Cancer
Society. As one explained: The coalition was broader than
the formal alliance, however, as it developed close working
relationships with politicians and key officials within the
health department. For example, several politicians be-
came champions of the Bill at different junctures and Dr
Tony Holohan, the Chief Medical Officer, was a prominent
and long-standing supporter. These relationships allowed
the Alliance to ‘[keep] on top of what was happening in
government… and what…might have been said in the me-
dia’. Moreover, to maintain message discipline, the steering
group advised experts ahead of their media appearances.
The Alliance also recruited individuals from member orga-
nizations who possessed a background in public affairs, in-
cluding those with prior roles as journalists and as political
advisers, thus possessing an intimate knowledge of the po-
litical system (see below).
Issue-framing
Issue-framing played a key role in establishing the policy
debate’s key contours. The Alliance used its website and
other communication materials to highlight the harms
caused by high levels of alcohol consumption. Advocates
also released hundreds of documents, including reports
and press releases, to generate media coverage (see
Table 2). Advocates also used social media, press interviews
and editorials at key stages of the Bill’s progression. When
the Bill was first published in spring 2015, a collection of
editorials were written to underline the principal harms
frame [52–55].
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The Alliance’s media presence afforded key opportuni-
ties to underline the extent of alcohol-related harms in
Ireland. Although the alcohol industry’s focus upon the
economic impact of the Bill (i.e. economic framing) was
also evident in the newspaper coverage (36% of articles),
coverage of health harms and the effects of alcohol on
children and young people were more prominent (in 70
and 45% of articles, respectively).
The Alliance engaged in lobbying, although it faced
entrenched alcohol industry positioning, and found clever
ways to pivot when confronting less advantageous frames.
When industry identified the economic costs of the Bill,
advocates responded by highlighting the health-care costs
associated with the status quo. This resonated, as concerns
over ‘wait times, delayed discharges and limited beds’ were
common in the media. ‘The Health Service was creaking
under the weight of alcohol… and we used every opportu-
nity to highlight that’, one advocate explained. Health-
care issues were a key voter concern in the 2016 general
election (and remained so in the subsequent 2020 general
election).
A key framing strategy was to focus upon the content
of the problem—the health harms—rather than the
particular measures within the Bill itself. As one strategist
explained:
Myadvice to the doctors when theywere goingon radio
was ‘you need to make this an everyday issue for people
to understand this… you need to give examples of the
likes of people who you are seeing’.
The structural separation debate underscored the risks in
debating policy solutions outside health or their implemen-
tation, and which mobilized actors in the broad industry
coalition. While health experts could credibly speak about
their experience treating alcohol-related harms, they were
less adept at discussing practical implementation issues in
non-health settings.
Advocates made extensive use of social media and
developed multi-media strategies to establish their
preferred framing. For example, photographs were posted
with questions underneath, such as: ‘if your child goes
into the shop, why are they looking at a bottle of Vodka
beside a packet of Smarties?’ Mental health issues were
salient in the media in the years running up to the Bill.
Alcohol contributed to half of all male suicides in
Ireland, which were very high by international standards.
AAI produced a short video to bring this home, featuring
John Higgins’s story, a man who had lost his son, David, to
suicide. In the video, David’s death is attributed to the
availability of cheap alcohol. The video garnered more
than 60 000 views on YouTube.
Additionally, the Alliance used infographics to help the
public visualize the damage of alcohol-related harms.
Three deaths every day could be attributed to alcohol,
and this statistic was underlined in every press release
and infographic. AAI’s press releases would estimate mor-
talities occurring since the Bill was first introduced
(and similarly supplied political representatives with
constituency-level data; see below). For example, in May
2018, AAI issued the following release:
This week… marks the passing of 900 days since the
[Bill] began its legislative passage… Over that time sadly
the shocking levels of alcohol-related harms have
continued unabated: 2700 deaths were alcohol-related
[56].
Evidence suggesting the Alliance’s campaigning was
highly successful is not limited to interview data. Advo-
cates were highly visible in newspaper coverage, garnering
specific mentions in 36% of newspaper articles about the
Bill. Alliance members also wrote many letters to the edi-
tor. As one advocate explained:
If [we] had a letter in the paper… it was easier to get a
meeting on that day [with politicians]… so the media
campaign [supported] the advocacy work and
vice-versa [57].
Framing activities thus facilitated access to key actors. The
Alliance’s efforts were also recognized by non-public health
specialists. The campaign won an award for Best Public Af-
fairs Campaign by two national public relations organizations.
According to one citation, the Alliance’s ‘expert stakeholder
alliances and evidence-based communications’ succeeded in
keeping alcohol on the agenda for more than 3 years, despite
facing a ‘well-resourced and culturally-embedded opposition’
[57].
Political learning
Convincing politicians to support policy change poses
obvious challenges for advocacy groups, even in this
context, where none of the political parties opposed the
legislation. We found that advocates possessed specific
expertise that was critical to the Bill’s passage. Of the
advocates interviewed, a majority had some previous
experience in the formal sphere of politics (e.g. former
politician or policy adviser) or journalism. Some key
figures, such as Suzanne Costello, the CEO of AAI, had
backgrounds in campaigning organizations. These experi-
ences provided advocates with heightened capabilities for
political strategy. The Alliance formed close relationships
with sympathetic politicians, thus broadening the coali-
tion, and leveraging these interactions to shape the legisla-
tive process. As one former senator recalled: The nature of
the relationships between Alliance members and individ-
ual politicians beyond the coalition varied greatly. In some
Coordination, framing and innovation 5
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instances, advocates found themselves meeting with
ministers about something unrelated to the Bill but were
encouraged to raise the Bill’s profile. The Alliance’s
lobbying efforts also took on more direct forms. For
example, the Alliance organized several information
sessions at the Oireachtas (Parliament) concerning
alcohol-related harms. As one expert explained, the meet-
ings allowed politicians to ‘pick our brains’.
Others described key lessons that had been drawn from
other successful public health campaigns in Ireland,
including the ban on smoking in enclosed public places.
According to one politician, ‘nobody gave [the smoking
bill] a chance given the strength of the publican’s lobby…
but by “mobilising an alliance of unlikely advocates [such
as] academics… and organised labour” the advocacy coali-
tion served as an effective counterweight to the industry
and its allies’.
Advocates also harnessed political information to target
politicians whowere sympathetic to industry efforts to pick
apart the legislation. The Alliance sent constituency-
specific information to draw politicians’ attention to the to-
tal number of alcohol-related deaths in their communities.
Local grassroots organizations played a key role in reinforc-
ing this tactic at the local level. Constituents were encour-
aged to write letters and send e-mails to their TDs: Alliance
members used their knowledge of parliamentary processes
and contacts. The Alliance, for example, mobilized
and assisted politicians on a cross-party basis to propose
amendments, including by formally establishing a group.
Advocates believed that they needed to be ‘proactive and
on the offensive’. Introducing amendments that strength-
ened the Bill ‘rather than waiting for the industry to
weaken its existing parts’was a key tactic. As one advocate
explained, ‘if you give [politicians] the amendments… it
makes it easier and more likely that they will take it upon
them, and… table them’. Although many amendments
were rejected, the Alliance secured a key victory when
the government amended the legislation to include cancer
warning labels.
Finally, advocates found a clever way to publicize the
extent of industry lobbying. In 2015, a lobbying registry
took effect in Ireland, requiring all lobbying activities to
be publicly disclosed. This was largely instigated by the
Labour Party in the Coalition Government, who have also
been the early champions of the Bill. Information from
the registry was then made public. Key coalition members
realized the potential of this new resource. As one advocate
explained: In several instances, reporters from the Irish
Times published stories about the industry’s lobbying efforts
[46,49,58–62].
Advocates exhibited sophistication throughout the
debates over the Bill. One expert, who was not formally
involved in the coalition, had this to say about its
influence:
[The Alliance] was pivotal because they made it a
campaign and they ran it like a campaign… Campaigns
are not accidental things… they have to have many
arms… they have to have a communications arm, a
political arm, a policy arm, [and] a civil service arm…
I think they covered all the bases… I think the public
health side [was] strong and…more savvy than before.
DISCUSSION
Our analysis documents the growing political sophistica-
tion and effectiveness of public health advocates in
Ireland. First, a broad-based coalition enabled advocates
to pool resources and coordinate their strategy and mes-
saging. Secondly, issue-framing was critical in shifting the
focus of the debate to alcohol-related harm. This
placed pressure upon politicians by making available
evidence on the extent of the problem. Finally, we pres-
ent evidence of political learning, where advocates’
knowledge of the political system spurred innovations
in campaigning.
The threemechanisms identified in our analysis are dis-
tinct but also inter-related. Creating a broad-based coali-
tion reflected lessons drawn from previous experience
with the Smoking Bill. Furthermore, the public health
framing mattered precisely because the Alliance’s archi-
tects had mobilized credible experts and organizations.
Thus, the effectiveness of each component was predicated
on synergies with other elements of strategy. Our findings
provide insights into the developing capacity of advocates
to drive major policy change.
This study contributes to a sparse literature [24,40,62].
Among the study limitations are the challenges of using re-
call of activities, spanningmore than 5 years in some cases,
and interrogating actors’ opinions. These data, however,
have been triangulated with data from other sources in
making inferences.
In considering the adoption of world-leading alcohol
policy innovation in Ireland, the specific context of major
cultural and political change over the past three decades
should also be recognized. The country’s early adoption
of the ban on smoking in public places, as well as na-
tional referenda on divorce, abortion and same-sex mar-
riage and subsequent change, resulted from hard-fought
advocacy campaigns. Such successes generate momen-
tum and are relevant to appreciating how the broader
advocacy community have professionalized over time.
Ireland’s long-standing problematic relationship with
alcohol as well its failure to get to grips with the problem
is another important consideration [1,5,6,11]. Inter-
viewees testified to the foundational research and/or advo-
cacy of key individuals, including Ann Hope, Shane Butler
and Joe Barry (who has continued in a leading role), in
interpreting international evidence in the Irish context.
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These experts were instrumental in generating high-level
awareness of the existence of a problem, gradually
re-framing the problem away from an issue affecting a
subgroup of ‘alcoholics’ towards a fuller population-level
understanding of alcohol harms. The historical roots of
policy innovation in Ireland were not the focus of our
analysis [6] but the significance of such efforts is clearly
relevant. Politicians were receptive to major policy change
due in part to sustained public attention to alcohol as a
problem [11].
This study contributes to a broader research pro-
gramme on the alcohol industry and the role of evidence
in alcohol policymaking [21,41,64,65]. A recurring find-
ing on the alcohol industry lies in the advantages it
holds over its opponents with respect to resources and
lobbying efforts [41]. This study, however, shows that
experts often possess unique capabilities or attributes—
such as public trust—which can help to mitigate the
industry’s resource advantage. Future research could
consider whether and how far the consumption of policy
information (e.g. frames) is subject to source effects [27]
and the extent to which trust can mediate this relation-
ship [66].
More broadly, our study illustrates how better engage-
ment between policy analysis and alcohol research can
generate insights for both research traditions. Policy
theory can help alcohol researchers to identify the
mechanisms underlying policy inertia and change, includ-
ing coalition-building and political learning [25]. This par-
ticular study also shows how alcohol policy developments
can inform policy theory. In the case of the ACF, the frame-
work’s core hypotheses have found support across a range
of settings [24,67]. Coordination and collective action have
been the least-studied parts of the framework [68]. This
study suggests that there are potential links between differ-
ent mechanisms—coordination and intra-coalition learn-
ing—in the framework.
Finally, the prolonged development of alcohol policy
innovation in Ireland underscores the perennial role of
conflict. The Irish advocacy coalition saw itself as fighting
a war with industry in pursuit of rational policymaking,
based on using high-quality scientific evidence to reduce
avoidable harms caused by alcohol. In such terms, an
important series of battles have been won, culminating in
the passage of what has become the Public Health
(Alcohol) Act 2018. However, the political war will not
end with legislative enactment. Researchers will need to
focus upon policy implementation, examining how each
coalition seeks to advance its interests and ideas in this
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